L. Introduction
One of the Breatest economic puzzles in an age of widely varying, random rates of inllation is the persistent use of nominal contracts, that is, of promises of a future payment of a prespecified, uncontingent sum of fiat money. The goal of this paper is to suggest reasons why such contlacts might represent the optimal contract form in a large. class of mvrtonments.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that every intlividual is generally a party to several contracts with several other individuals. Eence in this paper we study a general equilibrium model in which the equilibrium cotrtract form is optimal given the contlact form elsewhere in the economy. We consider two kinds of shocks' One induces a relative price shock, the other an aggregate price level shock. We show that there are reasonable economic environments in which contracts contingent on either shock aJe not superior to nominal contracts.
When there a,re relative price shocks, nominal (uncontingent) contracts are optimal if (i) individuals do not know with certainty which commodities they will want to consume in the future; (ii) preference shocks are trot observed by other individuals; and (iii) individuats are exposed, ex. ante, to the same kind of preference uncertainty. The first condition rules out the optimality of futures contracts for specific goods, and the secoad rules out making contracts contingent on realized preferences. The third implies that in equilibrium individuals, being ec anfe identical, will not wish to insure each other against relative price shocks.
When there are shocks to the aggregate price level, what matte$ is how alternative contract forms share the risk amont cotrtracting parties. In particular, if the cotrtracting parties have the same degree of relative risk aversion, au optimal contract system shares risk equally. I! as in our model, the net aggregate wealth of a generation is coastant in nominal terms, a system of nominal contracts ensures that each inrlividual has fired tromitral risk. In this way aggregate price shocks, whether they stem fron changes in the stock of goods or the stock of money, affect equally the wealth of every individual. If the net wealth of a generation includes both real aud uominal components, then nominal debt contracts together with simpie equity shares of the real component of wealth are suf6cimt to provide optimal risk sharing.
Departures from constant relative risk aversion imply that there are gains Aom having contracts contingent on aggregate shocks. But these gains are gererally a semnd order of magnitude, because in general, optimal risk sharing still requires wealthier individuals to bea.r more risk, though uot uecessarily in proportion to their wealth. Eence, small costs of incorporating contingencies may restore optimality of fixed noninal contracts, even if individuals differ in their risk attitudes.
When contracts are payable in fiat money, contingencies that reduce the uncertainty of final real wealth generally increase the uncertainty of cash flows. Hence, even if the state of the world is costlessly observable, contingent @ntracts payable in fiat money entail a cost: it is the cost of holding enough cash to meet the maximum contingent paJment specified by the contract. We show that for this reason fixed nominal contracts may be optimal evm if there are agtretate shocks obseryable at no cost a.nd individuals have different attitudes towards risk.
We formalize our reasoning in a fully specified, general equilibdum model of money and debt. In this model, fiat money.serves as a medium of ex&atrge, a means of payment and a unit of account. In particular, the interaction of agent preferences atrd the physical environment inplies that i) fiat money has value as a medi"m of exchange a.mong those who cannot trade directly, even if its rate of return is dominated by that of a^nother asset; ii) people bouow and lend, choosing to specify fiat money as the means of payment by which IOUs are settled; and iii) in several non-trivial circumstances, fiat money serYes as the unit of account, i.e., IOUs promising a {ixed nominal sum of fiat money are an optimal contract form. We wish to stress that these are all implications, not assumptions, of the model. No feasible, mutually advantageous contracts or narkets a.re arbitrarily ruled out and no demand for any asset or contract is imposed on the model.
There is a large literature that asks why nominal uncontiDtent contracts ale so widespread. Gottfries (1990) stresses the role of labor market imperfections, but his analysis iacks explicit microfoundations and his results hinge on the assumption that there is an urridentified cost of writing contingent coutracts. Cooper (fSAA) also focuses on the labor market in a model with microfoundations, but in his paper nominal contracts are geuerally not optinal, even if firms are risk neutral, arid the contract only provides risk sharing and has no aliocative role. (In our paper, by contrast, everybody is risk averse and IOU contracts serve both a risk-sharing and an allocative role.) Azariadis and Cooper (1985) show that uncontingent contracts may provide optimal risk sharing, but hete too, firms are risk neutral and in addition, the optimal contract is not noninal (in the sense that it is not payable in fiat money a.nd that it specifies an uncontingent real wage).
Finally Smith (1985) studies an overlapping generatiotrs economy in which nominal contracts are a device for sorting out different types of workers; but in nore general environments other sorting devices a.re likely to be available and optimal.
The paper outline is as follows. Section 2 lays out the model of an overlapping tenerations ecotromy with spatially separated agents born in each generation. Section 3 proves the optimality of nominal contracts whea there are only relative price shocks and future preferences are un-known. The general properties of an equilibrium with nominal contracts are described in section 4. In section 5, we show that nominal contracts lead to optimal sharing of aggregate risk if individuals have the same risk preferences. Section 6 proves that a binding cash-in-advance constraint on the settlement of private debt reinforces the optimality of nominal contracts. Finally, section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
The Model
This section describes the economic mvironment. A growing population is drstributed over a large, even uumber I of contiguous islands. The islands are located in a circle and are numbered mnsecutively in a clockwise direction arornd the circle according to the variable i, i=1,2...I. There is a separate market in each island; no centrafized rtinter-islandrr narket exists. Eouseholds, each comprised ol two partners, live two periods. A new generation is born every period. Each household is endowed with oae unit of non-storable output when youag and nothing when old.
The population of newborn households on each island is random. An island can either be "latgerr or !'small". A large island receives a number N, of newborn households in period t; a ry!! island receives a number dI,[, of uewborn households, where 0<7.
Whether an island is large or small in period t is determined by the realization of the random variable arr. For simplicity, &Jr can only take two values, 1 and 2, with equal probability. If rur=l, then all islands for which i is even are large in period t, and all islands for which i is odd are small. If dt=2, then the opposite is true. Because the total number of islands, I, is assumed to be even, the total population size does not depend on the realization of arr.
Each island produces a different commodity. This difference matters because the preferences of each household depend on its location on the circle. When young, a household born in island i wants only to consume the commodity produced on island i+1' Except for their location, ali young households are ideotical.t When old, each household moves to some other island, whose commodity it wants to consume.2 When young, the household does not yet know where it will move rvhen old.
Its destiuation when old depends on a preference shock that it will experieace in the second and last period of its life. Each old individual has the same probability of moving to an odd or an even island, and the saroe number of old consumers moves to each island. The realization of the preference shock is private information and cannot be learned by others.
The only relevant difference betweeu islands is whether they are large (L) or small (S); for this leason, we can write the expected utility function of an old household without reference to odd or even locations and to his preferince shock, and we only need to distinguish between households born in a sma.Il or large island. The expected utility of a household born in period t on an island of type k, for k-S,L is: 2 uGl) + lE u (.f*,(,,*,)) = u(*f) + |vi.f*,tr)) + +v(cf+1(2)) (2.1) ti:I where xf ana cf*, detrote its cousumption when young and old, respectively, and where U(.) and V(.) are twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, aod strictly concave functions. Notice that 1/2 is the probability of ending up on either type of island when old. I Townsend (1987) studies a related model with spatially separated individuals in an overlapping generbtions economy. Eowever ir his model, udike here, neighboring individuals only meet once in their lifetime, and hence cannot write IOU contracts among themselves. z
The randorn assigtrment of asetrts to other islands follows the models of Townsend (1989) and Mitsui and Watanabe (t9*90).
Each period is split into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period everybody observes the realization of the shock a.r and one partner of each household (young and old) starting on island i travels to island i*1.3 In the second sub-period the travelling partner returns, old households move to another island, and consumption ta.kes place. This structure of travel and the specified preferences generate the following trading pattern for a household born on island i. The pattern is outlined here and charted in Figue 1.
1) youth
i.) first sub-period <ach household is split into two units, a buyer a.ud a seller;
the buyer travels to island i+1 arld makes purchases by issuing IOUs payable next period;
ii.) second sub-period the debt repayer travels to island i*1 aud repays the household's IOUs with fiat the seller remains on island i and sells his commodity against IOUs receivable in the next Period to the young buyers coming from island i-1. the debt collector remains on its island and collects the fiat noney ' repayment of the Ious of island i-1.
-the partners reunite at the home island purchased ftom their neighbor;
atrd consume the commodity -the home commodity is sold for fiat money to the arriving oid households.
2) old age i.) first sub-period -the household is again split into two, a debrcollggigt and a debt reoaJrer; motrey;
ii. ) second sub-period -the two parttrers reunite and travel to some other island; -the househoid purchases the commodity of the destination island with fiat money, then consumes it.
I
The division of a household itrto a pfitner who travels and one rrvho stays is adapted fron a model attributed to Lucas by Townsend (fggO).
In the initial period (period 0) there is a generation of households of size No, equally distributed among all islands, that simply wish to maximize consumption on the island where they are located. This initiat old generation cannot trade until the second sub-period of the initial period. It has no endowment of goods but owus a total of N0M0 nnil5 qf fiat money on each island, implying an initial aggregate money supply equal to Mo=INoMo.
at the constant (gross) rate
The aggregate money supply is assumed to $ortr z=MrlMr_1. Changes in the stock of fiat money are used to finance government purchases to be spent in equal amounts in each island. Aggregate population grows at the cotrstant rate n=Nr/Nr-r. Shocks to population growth and to money supply Browth are studied in section 5 below.
Let bk and ak denote the nominal value of the IOU issued and accepted respectively by a young household born in an island oftype k, and let mk be the quantity of money that he holds, for k=L,S. Then we can write his budget constraints when young When old, the consumer faces the budget constraint:
pr*r(a,r*r) .fn, s -f + Rl+r(,rt+1)af -nf*r{"r*r)bf = Fl*r("r*r) , h,k-s,L , h+k (2.3)
where Rf*, (rr*r), nfnr(rr+r) are the possibly state-contingent, gross rates of return on the IOUs issued by individuals born in islands of type k and h respectively, F,*r(rar*r) denotes net nominal flnancial wealth, and nr*r(r.r,*r) is the price faced by the consumer when old, which depends on whether he ends up on a la.rge or small island, and hence on the realizations of the state ,,+t (", well as of his preference shock which we onit here to simplify notation). Note that since the preference shock is private information, individuala cannot write IOUs contingent on the realization of these shocks. The question of whether equilibrium contracts will be contingent on the shock a.r,*, which determines which islands are large and rrhich are sma.ll is addressed in the next section.
The previous asssmptions about timing have a straightforward but important implication for the nature of an equilibrium. Na.mely, ody fiat money will be accepted il payment for an IOU. The reason is that the old, who are scattered among the isla,uds, ueed fiat noney to carry out their consumption purchases when old. In particular, because of the spatial sepaxation betrveen islands, a payable IOU camot be settled by offering in e:<change an IOU issued by some other island. Eence, the settlement of an IOU is subject to a physically imposed cash-in-advance constrairt, which can be written as:
Rfnr(r,*r) uf s .f , k=L,s
The equilibrium coaditions in the securities markets oI each island are: prl=ut tt .l=au? .
In writing (2.5) we have used the fact that the young population in a small island is a fraction d of the population in a large island.
Since at the start of any period fiat money is held only by the old, and since by assunptiotr the old a.re drawn equally from all islands, the Boney supply in each island is N'Mr . With aggregate population growing at the (gross) rate n and with money supply growing at the (gross) rate z, the equilibrium condition in the money market of each island (2.4) (2.5a)
An implication of the market ciearing condrtions (2.5) aud (2.6) is that the aggregate nominal wealth of the old must equal the total stock of fiat money ldFs(r.,r*r) + nl(lu,*r)l I Nr/2 -Mr: IN.M,
ms(rr*J + rl(r.r,*r) = zMo(r/n)t
We can now define a rational expectations competitive equilibrium with optimal contracts (hereafter, simply "equilibrium") as a sequence of the vector 1nl*r, Ors, U,? "rs,
CCqTTT
.rs, *r? .rt, Rl*r, ptl, btl, "rt, -rt, rrt, .rtl such that i) young households choose money balances, IOUs payable and receivable, and consumption to maximize expected utility taking prices and interest rates as grven; ii) IOUs ta.ke a form such that it is not possible to increase the orpected utility of a member of any generation t without reducing the expected utility of another member of that generation; iii) each household maximizes o<pected utility basing its decisions on the probability distribution actually generated by the equilibrium; iv) markets in IOUs and fiat money clea.r.
The Equilibrium Contract If There Is No Aggregate Risk
In this section rre discuss urder what conditions nominal IOU contracts are optimal if the only sources of randomuess are relative price risk and shocks to preferences. Essentially aof:rvro (u/n)t -f:uo {,/"), 10 these conditions identify rryhen there is no insurable inclividual risk in this economy. Eence, the purpose of the section is maiuly to i ustrate a method of analysis and to ciarify the properties of the model, rather than to derive any general aud novel result. Section 5 extends the analysis to the more interesting case of aggregate price level shocks.
An IOU contract is a promise to pay Rl*r, j=L,S, units of fiat money tonorrow, for each IOU issued tod.ay. If Ri+l is not contingent on the rea.Iization of any shock, then we say that the IOU is a nominal coutract,rt since it is a promise to pay a fixed a,mount of money tomorrow, i[espective of the state of the world. The rate of return Ri*, cauaot be contingent on the preference shock when old, since the realization of this shock is private in{ormation. The remaining question is whether a contract for which Rl*, is not contingent on the realization of r,.rr*, is optimal, in the sense that it is not possible to increase the expected utility of a member of any getreration t without reducing the oeected utility of another member of that sa.me generation. The answer is contained in the followiag:
ProFsition 1: ff aggregate population growth and money supply growth are not random' then the nominal contract is an optimal IOU contract.
The proof is straightforward. An "optimal contracttr between the households of neighboring islands maximizes the expectd utility of those born on a small island for a given level of orpected utiiity of those born on a large isiand, subject to the constraints and the equilibriu:n conditions out[ned in the previous section. Consider first an equilibrium in which the cash-in-advance constraints (2.4) are not binding. Then, combining (2.1) and (2.3), and noting that every household has a probability of. ll2 of. ending up in a large or small isla.nd, we can characterize an optima^l contract as a choice of fs(r,u), Ft(r.r) for each r.r If the cash-in-advance constraint (2.4) is binding, then a Jortiori a nominal coutract is optimal, since a binding cash-in-advance cotrstraint makes it rnore difEcult to reshuffle cash between borrowers and lenders through contingent rates of return. The fornal proof is a bit more complicated, and is provided in section 6 below as a proof to Proposition 4.
The intuition underlying Proposition l is also straightforwartl. Suppose that Rj*, is not contingent oo ,,*r, and consider the expected utility of an old individual, conditional on the realization of arr*r, but not on that of the preference shock. By assumption every old individual has the same probability of travelling to an odd oI an even island. But then, whether odd islands are small and even islands are large, or vice versa, iS irrelevant: tbe realization of rt+l does l.ot affect this expected utility. Eence, an IOU contract contingent oo ,t+1 alone cannot achieve any relevant risk sharing among individuals born L2 in contiguous islands. A contract contingent on both ,r*, *d the destinations of the old (the preference shock) could. But such a contract is ruled out by an incentive compatibility condition, since the destinations of the old are not publidy observable ex-post.1 Therefore, given this incentive cotrstraint, a nominal IOU contract is optimalWe should note that the symmetry of the model plays a crucial role in the proof of this propositiou. Suppose for iustance that individuals born in an odd island have a probability greater than 1/2 of going to an odd island when old, and conversely that individuals born in an even island are more likely to go to an even island when old' It is easy to show in this case that individuals born in contiguous islands wish to insure each other against the relative price shock by writing IOU contracts contingetrt on the realization of r,r. Hence nominal contracts are no longer optimal' even if the preferelce shock is unobservable.
The general lesson to be drawn fton this section is that contingent contracts car provide insurance against relative price risk only if individuals are suffrciently different from each other itr an ex-ante sense. Which relative price risk one needs to iusure agailst is often ex-ante ulknown to the contracting parties. There are many consumption decisions, like going to a movie versus going out fol dinael, which a,re difEcult to predict in aalvance. These decisions are determioed by random events that are private information, aad which therefore cannot be incorporated in any contingent cotrtract. If individuals are subject to the same uncertainty about theil future preferences, so that everybody is ex-atrte identical, then nominal contlacts are optimal. If instead the contracting parties assign di{ferent probabilities to alternative future consumption baskets, then cotrtracts contingent on relative price shocks are optimal. Naturally, in tbis case a combination of a { Altematively, we could have made the simpler but more restrictive asumption that the destinatiotr whtin old is learned only upon arrival (i.e., after the IOU's are paid).
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nominal contract with an explicit insurance contract (or a future contract) would also be optimal.
Random relative prices present the household with two types of risk -the risk that it will wart to purchase an expensive good and the risk to the value ofits assets. The first type of risk is uninsurable because it is a shock to unobseryable preferencesl Therefore, the best that a household can do is to minimize the risk to the value of its assets by fixing the number of dollars it will have available for consumption when old. A system of contingent contracts with offsetting contingencies that leave each household with the .same..number of dollars in each state can accomplsh this but in a needlessly complicated way that requires the verification of the state. Contracts pronisiog fixed palments of toods would avoid the verification of the state, but would expose the household to the risk that the goods it is promised have a iow value. Only nominal contracts avoid both the risk to a household's wealth and the verification of the state-
Properties of the Equilibrium
This section outlines some geaeral properties of the equilibrium, including the valuation of the equilibri'rm contracts. We retain the assumption that there is no aggregate risk, so that nominal contracts are optimal ana Rf*r(arr*r)=Rf+, . Under this assumptioa, a young household born at time t in an island of type k , k=S,L, maximizes: u (bf /pl ) + |vtrf*,/nf*,1 + |v1rf*,/nf*,) , h=s,L , hrk Imposing (4.3) for periods t and t*1 a,nd taking ratios of the demand and supply for money ia both periocls, we obtain that the iuverse of the inllation rate in the stationary equiJibrium is a=p,/pr*r-n lz for dI t.
$-za) (4.2b)
A cash discount would be equivalent to Rtil > 1.
It is proved in the appendix that in a neighborhood of d+1, the Lagrange multiplier 't. px is non-increasing in 4 and strictly decreasing if pk>0. Intuitively, as the inflation rate rises (as r drops), individuals try to reduce their holdings of real cash balances. At some point the cash-in-advance constraint starts to bind, and when that happens nomitral interest rates on the IOU contracts rise above unity. As inllation keeps rising, the cash-in-advance comtraint becomes more and more binding, and pk increases.a
Equilibrium Contracts With Aggregate Randomness
AggreBate outout shocks We now discuss the desirability of nominal cotrtracts extends when there is randomness in aggregate output or in the fiat money stock. As an example of an economy with randomness in aggregate output, suppose that the (gross) rate of population growth, o*= N,/Nr_r , is an always positive i.i.d. random variable, rvhile the stock of fiat money grows at the co$tant rate z, like iu the previous sections. In this section we consider equilibria in which the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding.
Equilibria with binding cash-in-advance constraints are stuclied in the next section.
The stationary distribution of growth rates of population ensures the existence of stationary equilibrium like the one described in the previous section. In particular, repeating the argument of the previous section, the inverse of the inllation rate betr,veen t 6 , a liquidity .tu1sh. (i.e;, a more bjn$ug cash-i-n -adva.nce constraint) is the cash-in-i the cash-in-advance constraint-becomes more binding, young households,reduce _thgir In this economv. a liouiditv cruach (i.e.. a more binding cash-in-adva.nce jrt) is associatea *ltn hiEher (and not lorier)'real money balanEes-. -Intqitively., as demand of consumption loans. The equilibrium counierpart is that more toods are sold for cash (to the old) and less for credit (to the voune) so that real noney balances ircrease. This ieature of ihe model, which is 'not eutirely -i'mplausible, is due fo the fact that the cash-in-advance constraint binds the repayment of consumotion loans, rather than the ourchase of consumer qoods, as itr the famiht nodels o-f hrcas (1980) and Svelsson (1983) . We conjecture that, wlth a labor-leisure choice when young, the real money balances will no longer always increase with expected inflation, even though p" would. In addition, the equilibrium relative price between the commodities sold in large and small islands is unaffected by the aggregate shock, since by (4.3) it is given by:
nflnf=OqsTnr for atl t. Thus, the risk to the value of fiat money posed by the aggregate population shocks strikes money-holders belonging to the same generation iu the same way, irrespective of where they are born. A large realization of nr*, makes households from both large and sma.ll islaads of generation t better ofr by increasing the value of their real money balances, while for a small rea.lization of nr*, both members of generation t are worse off. Therefore this aggregate risk cannot be insured away, but it can only be shared between households born in different islands and belonging to the same generation.
If all islands are alike, (if F1), then all nembers of the sane generation are identical. In this case optimal risk sharing requires that everybody fuces exactly the same risk. Since every individual is a party to two opposite contracts, optiroal risk sharing imposes only the general requirement that exactly the same contingencies be incorporated in every contract. When this requirement is satisfied, the effect of the aggregate shock on the two IOU contracts written by every individual ofilset each other exactly; the aggregate shock then only affects individual welfare by chan6ing the purchasing power of real money balances, and since everybody within a generation is identical, this is the same for all.
Thus, nomiual contracts are optinal, as are many other contracts. case of nominal contracts. Equation (S.4) reveals that optimal risk sharing under constant relative risk aversion requires that the ratio between the wealth of tvo members of the same generation born in difierent types of islands must be the same for all realizations of the aggregate shock. Because some fraction of a household's wealth already lies in its fiat money balauces, the simplest way to achieve a proportionate exposure to aggregate risk is to denominate all wealth (net IOUs as well as fiat money) in nominal terms. Eence the optimality of a system of nominal contracts.
Monetary shocks: Suppose now that the rate of growth of fiat money is a serially .
[ncorrelated random variable, that has a time t realization we denote as 2.. We immediately have:
Proposition 3: If all households extribit the same degree of constart relative risk aversion, fixed nominal coutracts a.re optimal even in the presence of shocks to the rate of growth of fiat money.
To ulderstand this proposition, it is simply necessary to see that ftom (5.1), shocks to z have the same but opposite effects oD the inflation rate as shocks to n. A forrnal proof of Proposition 3 would therefore follow the steps of Proposition 2.
Risk sharing with real assets Our model is a bit special in its insistence that a,n optioal system of contracts requires that all contracts be fixed in noninal returns. Thjs results from the model's 45snmption that fiai money is the only source of outside wealth of the old. Suppose instead that households will receive fixed endowments of real goods when old.z If these endowments are not exactly proportionate to a household's equilibrium net wealth, nomiual debt alonp will no longer proportionately erpose households to aggretate risk. Eovsever, the simple combination of nominal debt and equity in real endowments r We leave aside the question of how much endowments could be sold to acquire the fiat money desired by the^ old when they travel. For a simple, if arbitrary, &ample, suppose that the endowmetrts can be sold by the old to the young but can-not be used to repay consnmption loans (so that the cash-in-advance constraint may still bind).
could aow be used to let each household hold reat and net nominal assets in the same proportion--thus exposing theii portfolios to the same proportionate risk.
To make this a bit more precise, iet Xk and Yk denote the real stocks of the otld antl even island goods owned in equilibrium by an old household of type k and let P"(ca,n) and P"(r,r,n) represent the nominal price of goods on odd and even islands respectively as functions of r,,r aud n. We will continue to let Fk(r,r,u) , $=r,.
Then the ratio of the total wealth of small to Iarge island households is (1+ ,prPo(r.r,n) + rf"(r.r,n))Ft (1+ tp*Po(ar,n) + grP"(ra,n))Fs FS
wlich is a constant for all (r,l,n), thus satisfying the requirenent for optimal risk sharinS.
In this way portfolios containing two simple assets, equity and nominal debt, can achieve optimal risk sharing against both aggregate (n) and relative ( r,.r) risk.
Other advantaees of nominal contracts If preferences do not exhibit constatt relative risk aversion, then nomiual contracts no longer provide optimal risk sharing.
Eowever, nominal contracts are obviously simpler and easier to enforce. Moreover, the risk sharing offered by contingent contracts can have at best only a second order advantage over nominal contracts since both parties to nominal cotrtracts share aggregate risk in 20 proportion to their wealth. Therefore, it is easy to imagine economies in rvhich some cost of incorporating contitrgetrcies will outweigh the benefits.
One potential cost is obvious: the cost of observing or verifying the shocks to population or money stock. Both population and the money stock are aggregate variables; thus they may not be automatically revealed to irdividuals as would, say, an individual's own endorvment of goods. It would be natural to assune then that aggregate variables nay be observed by an individual only at some cost. A usefid feature of norninal contracts in our model is therefore that they share risk whiie requiring no information about aggregate variables, in contrast to contracts contingent on the state. Any costs iqcurred il.
obserying the state represents a deadweight loss to the contractitrg parties, which may not be offset by the second order benefits of risk sharing.a
The next section shows that rrhen cash-in-advance constraints bind, there is yet another cost in incorporatitrg contingencies into cotrtracts.
Nominal Contracts and Binding Cash-in-Advance Constraints
The propositions stated to this point in the paper have all been restricted to equilibria in which the cash-in-advance constraints do not bind. We deiayecl our presentation of the case of binding cash-in-advance constraints because nominal contracts are more likely to s In maay economies, prices reveal all the information about aggregate variables that individuals re{uire. In our^ economy, however, individuals must repay their IOUs before the market exihange of the money bwned by ihe arrivi-ug old for the endowments of the youns. Hence. IOIis must be settied before irices reveal iheir information about the state 6f th6 world. Contracts payable in a fixed qriantity of goods also require information about economic aggregates. Because the settling bf IOUs requires payment in mon-ey, cotrtracts requiring a!"ayient worth a fixed basket 5f goods must evaluite the price oJ-these goods to defermiie tie monev owed. Since the priie is not vet directlv observable, it must be inferred fron informatior about the population and inoney stoik. Therefore, cotrtlacts denomiuated in fixed real terms are tie same as money contlacts contingent on the state, and require just as much (poteutially costly) information about agtregate variables. 11 be optimal in this case.
Since coD.tracts in our model economy must be settled using fiat money, contingent contracts require that agents hold enough fiat money to make the maximum paymetrt specified. A contingent contract with the same expected payment as some loncontingent contlact will therefore require the holding of more fiat mouey. When cash-in-advance cotrstraints bind, there is a utility cost to the holding of additional money balances. If this cost exceeds the benefit of the risk sharing through contingent contracts, a nominal contract will be optimal despite an opportuaity for mutually beneficial risk sharing. Our reasoning is developed more formally in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 4: There exist economies with aggregate randornness a.nd non-constant relative risk aversion for which Dominal contracts are the oDtimal contract forn because of binding cash-in-advance constraints.
Proof: To prove proposition 4, we first characterize the Kuhl-Tucker conditions defining a,n optimal contract under aggregate uncertainty and bincling cash-in-advance constraints.
We then present a class of preferences whose deviation fron constant relative risk aversion is a continuous function of some parameter ?. We then show that there exist sone values of 'y such that the conditions for the optimal contract are met when nominal returns on contracts are not contingent on the state.
We take for granted that the optimal contract is independent of r,r by the reasoning already explored in Propositions 1 and 2, so that we may couceutrate on the implications of the aggregate randomness in n.
To keep the notation as simple as possible, we presetrt the proof of the simple discrete case in which n takes only two values, n., and n" , and takes each value with equal probability. In this two-state case, let RS and RL+eL denote the nominal rates of returD in state 1, and let Rs+rS and Rt denote the nominal rates of return in state 2.
When cash-in-advance constraints bind, it would make no setrse to write cotrtracts that increase the rate of returu paid to and bv the same island in some state since that would increase the cash balances of both types of islands. For this reason we restrict eS and ef, to be of the same sign, which we assume is non-negative without loss of generality. Eere we are essentially defining n, to be the state in which optirnal risk sharing requires atr extra payment to small island agents.
An optimal contract must then maximize ou., .S20 and etl0 a weighted. averag€ of agents' expected utilities, constrained by the cash-in-advance constraints. By (2.3) the Lagrangean of this problem in a stationary equilibirum is: I t ,f__e1_ntttnt+,tf The first treo terms of (5.2) represent the net marginal social benefit of risk sharing in state 1. The marginal cost is represented by pr, the marginal utility cost of holding fiat money with a bindiug cash-in-advance constraint.
We saw in Proposition 2 that there is no benefit to risk sharing when agents have the same relative risk aversion. It follows that as preferences approach constant relative risk aversion, the value of risk sharing goes to zero. The ma.rginal cost of holding money balances (7.1) however, does uot necessarily approach zero as preferences approach constant relative risk aversion. That is, the cash-in-advance constraint will be binding for a large set of constant relative risk aversion preferences. Therefore, it is easy to envisage preferences yielding a smali enough value of risk sharing or a large enough value of p such that the condition (5.2) holds with a strict iaequality. In such a case, the optimal values of .L aod eS equal zero, implying that the optimal contract is nominal.
It may help at this point to consider the class of preferences given by when '7=0, \rye may therefore consider ? as a measure of the deviation ftom constant relative risk aversion for preferences in this class. Therefore, the statemeot that there ocists au economy with non-constant relative risk aversion but for which the optimal 24 coDtract is nominal can be restated as a statement that for My lt>o we can choose a non-zero 'y sufficiently dose to 0 such that the first order condition (5.2) with respect to r holds with strict inequality.
Q.B.D.
Summarized, the proof to Proposition 4 relies on two points. First, the benefit of contingent coutracts goes to zero as the difierence in relative risk aversion of the two parties goes to zero. Second, the cost of adding contingencies to contracts, which is the " marginal utility cost of holding money, p, may well be strictly positive. It follows directly that the costs will exceed the benefits in some neighborhood of constant relaiive'risk aversion. In this neighborhood nominal contracts are optimal.
It should be noted that a similar proof of the optimality of nominal cotrtracts enists if the difference in relative risk aversion is negligible because the ex ante wealth of households on large islands is suf6ciently close to that on small islands, for any given utility function. A similar proposition might specify some cost p of obseffing the state as the cost of contingent cotrtracts (replacing p, the cost of holding ertra money), along the lines discussed at the end of the previous section.
An interesting feature of the optimal contracts described in the proof to Ploposition 4 is that nominal contracts are more likelv to be optimal the greater is the marginal utility of money, p. As shown in the appendix, p gmerally increases as exoected inflation rises, implying that, other things being equal, we are more likely to see trominal contracts in times of high expected inflation. This may contribute to explain why nominal contracts ancl the use of money as a unit of account are not completely abandoned even in times of hlaerinilation, when both price level uncertainty and expected inflation are very high. The cost of writing coutingencies into coutracts payable in fiat money increases with 25 (expected) inflation because of the extra money balances that must be held. During a hyperinflation both expected idlation aud price level uncertainty rise, with a,nbiguous effects on the optimality of nominal contracts.
7. Concluding Rema.rks
We conclude the paper with a general observation on how the optimality of nominal contracts relates to some fundamental properties of a monetary ecooomy. In the general eqtilibrium nodel of the previous pages, fiat money coexists with other assets, it can be dominated in rate of return, and serves as a medium of exchange, as a tneans of paymeut and, under general cirumstances, as a unit of account. Ii is a medium of exchange between agents that belong to different generations, because they meet only once in their lifetime.
It is a means of payment because no centralized narket exists in which all contracts can be simultaneously cleared (or, equivalently, the velocity of circulation of contracts is not ilfinite). Thus, when coutracts are settled, the creditor demands to be paid in fiat money knowing that he can exchange money for commodities later on. Finally, under the conditions discussed in the previous sections, the terms of the contract are expressed in units of fiat money (i.e., they are fixed noninal contracts). Eence money is also a unit of account.
These three roles of money are linked to each other, and are essential to understanding why nominal contracts may be optimal even neglecting computational or information gathering costs.e Money is used as a Beans of payrreat precisely because it is also a medium of exchange. And being a mea,ns of payment, it is more likely to be used as s Niehans (19?8) , Fama (1983) and White (1984) , arnong others, refer to these computational aspects. This is equivalent to saying that the substitution effect dominates the income effect.
If, on the other hand, (A.5) is biniling, then real money balances are deternined by U' (l-q)-rV' (q"X+_q)' = 0 (A.7) which is obtained by combining (A.1) and (A.5). In this equilibrium, real money balances are a6ain a function of r, q=Q+(r). But here, under the assumptiou that both U(.) and V(.) have a relative risk aversion coefEcient smaller than udty, Q|<0. That is, higher inllation increases real noney balances in equilibriun. The intuition is that when the cash-in-advance cotrstraitrt binds, higher expected inllation induces households to reduce consunptiou when young. As everybody does that, sales against IOUs are reduced atrd sales against cash (and hence real money balances) increase. The key to urderstanding this lesult is that the cash-in-advance constraint here binds the repayrnent of consumption loans, rather than directly the purchase of consumer goods. Finally, note that by (A.5), the interest rate R also rises as r drops, siuce it moves itr the same direction as m.
Since by (A.5) the cash-in-advaDce constraitrt is just binding at q:1/2, wg ce" Thus, for R-1, p:0. Whereas for R>1, p is a furction of n Under the same condition mentioned above, that U(.) and V(.) have a relative risk aversion coelficient smaller than unity, aud differentiating (A.9) with respect to r, it is possible to show that p is decreasing in n, and strictiy decreasing if 1/r>1/z*, i.e., the cash-in-advance constraint becomes more binding as inflation increases. ,=*+u'(l-q).
